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A DIFFERENT TYPE OF PROPERTY:
WHITE WOMEN AND THE HUMAN PROPERTY
THEY KEPT
Michele Goodwin*
INCIDENTS IN THE LIFE OF A SLAVE GIRL. By Harriet A . Jacobs. Bos-
ton: Thayer & Eldridge. 1861. (L. Maria Child & Jean Fagan Yellin
eds., Harvard Univ. Press 1987). Pp. xxxiii, 306. $22.50.
THEY WERE HER PROPERTY: WHITE WOMEN AS SLAVE OWNERS IN
THE AMERICAN SOUTH. By Stephanie E . Jones-Rogers. New Haven:
Yale University Press. 2019. Pp. xx, 296. $30.
After a brief period of suspense, the will of my mistress was read, and we
learned that she had bequeathed me to her sister’s daughter, a child of five
years old .
—Jacobs, pp. 7–8
Sexism and the abuse of male power, in part, define the American expe-
rience. Historically, sexism1 (and racism)2 pervaded legislative and judicial
* Chancellor’s Professor of Law & Founding Director of the Center for Biotechnology
& Global Health Policy, University of California, Irvine. The author is grateful to the editors at
the Michigan Law Review and to Jaime Allgood for her exemplary research assistance. Grati-
tude is also due to the Gilder Lehrman Postdoctoral Fellowship at Yale University, which in
2000 provided the support and resources to investigate archives on the American and Caribbe-
an slave experience, particularly with a view of sex. That research continues to bear fruit. I val-
ued the comments from my colleagues at the University of California, Irvine and other
faculties. © Michele Goodwin.
1. See, e .g ., Minor v. Happersett, 53 Mo. 58, 64–65 (1873) (affirming state legislation
denying women the right to vote); Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 130, 141 (1873) (af-
firming an Illinois statute that denied female law graduates admission to the bar because “civil
law, as well as nature herself, has always recognized a wide difference in the respective spheres
and destinies of man and woman. . . . The natural and proper timidity and delicacy which be-
longs to the female sex evidently unfits it for many of the occupations of civil life”); Hoyt v.
Florida, 368 U.S. 57, 61–62 (1961) (denying women participation in juries, opining that “wom-
an is still regarded as the center of home and family life”); see also Jill Elaine Hasday, Contest
and Consent: A Legal History of Marital Rape, 88 CALIF. L. REV. 1373, 1375 (2000).
2. For a catalogue of discriminatory “race” laws, see STATES’ LAWS ON RACE AND
COLOR (Pauli Murray ed., Univ. of Ga. Press 2017) (1951) (copiously documenting myriad
race-based laws adopted by legislatures throughout the United States, including prohibiting
integration in schools, segregating accommodations, imposing racial restrictions in cemeteries,
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decisionmaking, shaping law and how we understand it. Laws that permitted
marital rape and wife beatings buttressed those that forbade women from
voting, becoming lawyers, and more. In this way, what male legislators imag-
ined, male judges authorized. The reach of masculinity, domination, and
power so permeates American thought that it obscures the ways in which
women wield and abuse power—historically and in the present. This Review
concerns the former, assessing the complicity of white women as power bro-
kers, traffickers, and owners of enslaved African Americans during slavery.
Taking seriously Harriet Jacobs’s observation in 1861 that “the secrets of
slavery are concealed like those of the Inquisition,” this Review excavates the
archives of American law to shine a light on an overlooked history relevant
to how we understand women in American law and society.3
As such, this Review offers a compelling and complicated counterintui-
tive proposition. It challenges the archetypical accounts of sex, race, and
slavery that claim white women played no meaningful role in the enterprise
of slavery beyond passively managing antebellum households. It also chal-
lenges an alternative account of white women’s involvement in slavery: that
their only engagement was proximate to that of the white men in their lives.
The latter, more reductive, account suggests that as white slaveholding men
died, white women (spouses, mothers, and daughters) manumitted enslaved
Black people who lived among them.4 Both accounts suffer from historical
inaccuracies and omissions. Failure to capture, chronicle, and understand
these distinctions with greater nuance serves to conflate—at least at an epis-
temological level—white female abolitionists with white women who profit-
ed economically or symbolically from slavery (by means of stature in wealth
and by means of race privilege in poverty).
In her detailed account of “the Southern Lady,” Anne Firor Scott chron-
icles the skill white women exerted in buying and expanding plantations, as
well as managing hundreds of enslaved Black people even in the wake of
their husbands’ deaths. She notes that many of these women were quite suc-
cessful in purchasing land and establishing profitable plantations on their
own throughout the South. In some instances, this included the “manage-
ring interracial marriages, banning the interchange of textbooks between “white and colored
schools,” and imposing segregation in colleges and universities, among other racially discrimi-
natory enactments, most of which were upheld by local courts and generally legalized by Plessy
v . Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 551–52 (1896)).
3 . See Jacobs, p. 35 (pointing to the concealed record of blatant sexual abuse, rape, and
incest among slave owners, noting, “My master was, to my knowledge, the father of eleven
slaves. But did the mothers dare to tell who was the father of their children? Did the other
slaves dare to allude to it, except in whispers among themselves? No, indeed! They knew too
well the terrible consequences”); see also MARY R. BEARD, WOMAN AS FORCE IN HISTORY
(1946) (critiquing a feminist account of American history that regards white women primarily
as victims rather than as possessing agency, economic means, and rights secured by courts of
equity).
4. Jones-Rogers, p. ix (describing the erasure of white women from the interstate slave
trade as a “commonly held patriarchal view”).
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ment” of several hundred enslaved Black people on plantations that pro-
duced sugar, cotton, and other agricultural staples.5
To be clear, not all white women possessed the economic capacity or de-
sire to enslave Black people. Equally, however, it would be historically inac-
curate to suggest that poor whites were more closely aligned with
abolitionists simply because they did not own slaves. To the contrary, ante-
bellum poverty and hardship, though often cruel, did not align with social
and political opposition to slavery. Rather, poor whites participated in the
broader social and economic structures of slavery. As Elizabeth Fortson Ar-
royo writes, poor whites sought their own “self-interest” and were cognizant
of “what improvements in their lives they hoped to effect, and which other
members of southern society could help or hinder them.”6
As diaries, other empirical records, and legal cases show, slaveholding
white women, particularly (although not exclusively) of the South, strategi-
cally fought to maintain slavery, engaging in litigation with banks, siblings,
and others when ownership of their “property” came under threat.7 And
while most common depictions of Black human bondage involved sprawling
plantations, slavery also included more modest acquisitions of Black people.
Importantly, as owners and traffickers in enslaved Black people, white wom-
en were not passive participants in slavery—nor were they silent allies to the
Black women whom they enslaved.8
Slavery became a critical part of white women articulating independence
through law. By suing their husbands for “separation of property,” white
5. ANNE FIROR SCOTT, THE SOUTHERN LADY 34–35 (1970) (“The skill with which
many widows carried on plantations suggests that women knew a good deal more about the
planting operation than has generally been supposed.”).
6. Elizabeth Fortson Arroyo, Poor Whites, Slaves, and Free Blacks in Tennessee, 1796–
1861, 55 TENN. HIST. Q. 56, 57 (1996). But see Stephen V. Ash, Poor Whites in the Occupied
South, 1861–1865, 57 J.S. HIST. 39, 40 (1991) (arguing that poor whites of the South were
“cowed” into supporting slavery and “seduced . . . into supporting secession and war”).
7 . See, e .g ., Atkinson v. Atkinson, 15 La. Ann. 491, 491 (1860) (“This suit is brought to
enjoin the seizure of certain property [enslaved Black people] claimed by the plaintiff as her
separate property, and seized under execution by certain creditors . . . .”); Bertie v. Walker, 1
Rob. 431, 431 (La. 1842) (plaintiff appealing the judgment upholding seizure of “a negro slave
named Matilda,” whom “she bought . . . in her own name, for the price of eleven hundred and
fifty dollars”); Bourgeois v. Bourgeois, 17 La. 494, 496 (1841) (“The record shows however a
judgment in her favor for $4,304[.]06, followed by a fi. fa. and alias fi. fa.; and an appraisement
of the very slaves seized in this suit, made on the 12th of June, 1837 . . . .”). See also the Nancy
Pinson Papers (1820–1890) (on file with the LSU Libraries Special Collections), and the collec-
tion of diaries and papers of women slave owners at LSU.
8 . See, e .g ., Jacobs, p. 38 (“[M]y mistress, like many others, seemed to think that slaves
had no right to any family ties of their own; that they were created merely to wait upon the
family of the mistress. I once heard her abuse a young slave girl, who told her that a colored
man wanted to make her his wife. ‘I will have you peeled and pickled, my lady,’ said she, ‘if I
ever hear you mention that subject again. Do you suppose that I will have you tending my chil-
dren with the children of that nigger?’ ”).
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women secured paraphernal rights in their slaves.9 Some states, such as Lou-
isiana, provided for such litigation and vindication of white women’s
rights.10 In fact, a close reading of legal archives also reveals the lengths to
which slaveholding white women would exercise agency and dominion over
enslaved Black people, including committing fraud, in order to preserve
their claims to slaves. This included white women making false claims of
ownership for slaves they did not legally possess or that their husbands un-
willingly relinquished through means of seizure and bankruptcy due to un-
paid debts.11
Importantly, such mistakes and omissions in recounting and recasting
American history ignore structural, political, and economic benefits white
women gained from their personal involvement in chattel slavery.12 From
ignoring or discounting white women in their actual roles and capacities in
chattel slavery, a simplistic, homogeneous rendering emerges, which affects
how we understand centuries of U.S. law, cultural attitudes, and social rela-
tions from the seventeenth century through slavery’s abolition in the nine-
teenth century. Further, recognizing the realities of white women’s roles in
slavery serves in turn to acknowledge on a broader scale the suffering Black
9. Paraphernal property refers to property in which the wife possesses complete con-
trol and whereby the property is not subject to joint ownership and cannot be defined as con-
jugal property. See Bostwick v. Gasquet, 11 La. 534, 537 (1838) (“[A] judgment of separation of
property is null under the code, if it has not been executed by the payment of the rights and
claims of the wife, made to appear by authentic act, or at least by a bonâ fide non-interrupted
suit, to obtain payment; and that when a judgment of separation has been duly obtained and
published, the situation of the parties is as if no community had existed between them.”).
10 . See, e .g ., Hickey v. Duplantier, 4 La. 314, 316 (1832) (“Mrs. . . . obtained a judgement
of a competent tribunal by which a plantation and several slaves were decreed to her as her
separate property . . . .”).
11 . Id . at 315 (reversing a lower court decision that held a decree of separation “null and
void” in a case where a widow “pleaded a separation of property from her husband anterior to
his death,” and that the slaves were “transferred to her as separated in relation to the commu-
nity of goods from her husband”).
12 . Id .; see also THAVOLIA GLYMPH, OUT OF THE HOUSE OF BONDAGE: THE
TRANSFORMATION OF THE PLANTATION HOUSEHOLD 77 & n.44 (2008) (addressing southern
white women’s economic reliance on slavery to maintain sophisticated lifestyles, explaining
“[n]ot only [that they] could [] not live without ‘Negro help,’ neither could they practice ‘true
economy,’ if doing so meant living without extravagance. . . . Wealthy planter women adorned
themselves and their homes with expensive kid gloves, French calico, black silk, organdy, em-
broidered handkerchiefs, damask napkins, and French towels”). The benefits white women
gained then persist today in various ways, like the overrepresentation of white women in femi-
nist organizations. See, e .g ., Caroline Kitchener, ‘How Many Women of Color Have to Cry?’:
Top Feminist Organizations Are Plagued by Racism, 20 Former Staffers Say, LILY (July 13,
2020), https://www.thelily.com/how-many-women-of-color-have-to-cry-top-feminist-
organizations-are-plagued-by-racism-20-former-staffers-say [https://perma.cc/ECS4-HSSG]
(describing how women of color struggle to find belonging in feminist organizations that
seemingly shut them out, noting that “[w]omen of color have struggled to find that . . . sense of
belonging at NOW”).
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women and their families endured at the mercy of their sisters—quite literal-
ly in some instances.13
This Review closely examines Harriet A. Jacobs’s Incidents in the Life of
a Slave Girl and Stephanie E. Jones-Rogers’s They Were Her Property: White
Women as Slave Owners in the American South,14 adding to the canon on
American slavery generally by providing a more accurate woman-centered
account of the social and legal orders of antebellum America. However, the
value of this project and its lines of inquiry extend beyond slavery’s past as it
foregrounds internecine feminist battles of the twentieth century, including
suffrage and Jim Crow, as well as social and legal challenges in the present.15
In this way, the Review contributes to correcting an “interpretive inertia”
that results “in the study of women’s history” being sidelined.16
This Review advances three claims in its contribution to the relatively
nascent legal study of white women and their legal and social involvement
with slavery as purposeful participants. First, it stresses that the common
erasure of white women as slaveholders renders their culpability and com-
plicity in human chattel slavery imperceptible. Simply put, they become
blameless and guiltless in an enterprise in which their involvement was far
more than proximate and was in fact, in many instances, dominant.17
13 . See, e .g ., infra note 75.
14. Stephanie E. Jones-Rogers is an Associate Professor in the Department of History at
the University of California, Berkeley.
15 . See generally Maryann Reid, Black Women Are Paid Less than White Women: Here’s
Why It Matters, FORBES (Aug. 22, 2019, 9:34 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/maryannreid
/2019/08/22/black-women-are-paid-less-than-white-women-heres-why-it-matters [https://
perma.cc/9GYN-5PTN] (“Putting white women at the forefront of the wage gap mimics the
plight of the feminist movement in the 1960s when white women were at the forefront and
black women at the bottom. There is a legacy of discrimination and a history of white women
not standing side by side with black women when it comes to discrimination. This creates a
distrust of white women in power. Which ultimately impacts the mental and physical health of
black women when there is no allyship. When you are silent to the injustices of others who are
impacted the most, it does nothing for your own liberation.”); Kim McLarin, Can Black Wom-
en and White Women Be True Friends?, WASH. POST (Mar. 29, 2019, 12:15 AM),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/nation/2019/03/29/can-black-women-white-women-be-
true-friends/ [https://perma.cc/2DBB-L54Z] (“White women sit at the right hand of power,
leaning in, not down. There have been 41 white female governors . . . but not a single black fe-
male one. . . . White women hold 4.4 percent of CEO positions, but black women hold 0.2 per-
cent. Every ‘Equal Pay Day,’ white feminists decry that women average 80 percent of a man’s
salary but rarely mention that the figure applies mostly to white women: Latinas average 54
cents for every dollar, black women average 68 cents, American Indian and Alaskan Native
women make 58 cents.”); Toni Morrison, What the Black Woman Thinks About Women’s Lib,
N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 22, 1971, at SM14, https://www.nytimes.com/1971/08/22/archives/what-the-
black-woman-thinks-about-womens-lib-the-black-woman-and.html [https://perma.cc/M5PW
-SXT6].
16 . See Hilary McD. Beckles, White Women and Slavery in the Caribbean, HIST.
WORKSHOP J., Autumn 1993, at 66, 66–67.
17. SCOTT, supra note 5, at 36–37 (“Few aspects of women’s work accorded so poorly
with the image of delicate, frivolous, submissive women than the responsibility for managing
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Second, scrubbing white women from the archives of antebellum history
serves to deny not only their agency but also their capacities. In other words,
removing white women as profiteers and commanders in slavery serves to
erase the fact that some were successful, shrewd businesswomen, albeit in a
horrid enterprise. Even those who “managed households” rather than large
plantations wielded authority.
In troubling ways, this erasure both served to recast white women as dis-
interested in work and business, which defined Supreme Court jurispru-
dence on sex for many years, and contributed to the stereotype of white
women as fragile, disempowered, weak, and vulnerable to lingering effect.18
In recent decades, diligent efforts by historians correct inaccuracies in this
record.19
Third, and perhaps most complicatedly, this Review argues that reading
white women as passive or submissive participants in the business of ante-
bellum slavery served to undermine their later employment attempts and
business opportunities after slavery’s abolition and through the 1900s. Con-
trary to the Supreme Court’s patriarchal reading of women’s capacities and
destinies in Hoyt v . Florida,20 Goesaert v . Cleary,21 or Bradwell v . Illinois,22
white women clearly were not wedded or destined to domestic duties but
had experience in financial management and business.
The Review proceeds in three parts. In the brevity necessitated by the
Book Review format, Part I addresses slavery as an unmined and generally
ignored legal subject, particularly in legal education. Part II describes and
analyzes slavery from a different point of view, centering the experience of
slaves. . . . Supervising slaves was difficult, demanding, frustrating, and above all never-
ending.”).
18 . See, e .g ., ELIZABETH FOX-GENOVESE, WITHIN THE PLANTATION HOUSEHOLD: BLACK
AND WHITE WOMEN OF THE OLD SOUTH (1988) (problematically contributing to such stereo-
types); ROBIN DIANGELO, WHITE FRAGILITY: WHY IT’S SO HARD FOR WHITE PEOPLE TO TALK
ABOUT RACISM 132–33, 137 (2018) (addressing the perception of white women’s fragility in
particular detail); see also Ruby Hamad, Opinion, How White Women Use Strategic Tears to
Silence Women of Colour, GUARDIAN (May 7, 2018, 2:00 PM),
https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2018/may/08/how-white-women-use-strategic-
tears-to-avoid-accountability [https://perma.cc/S5YU-8ZZ8] (“And then there is a type of
trauma inflicted on women of colour that many of us find among the hardest to disclose, the
one that few seem willing to admit really happens because it is so thoroughly normalised most
people refuse to see it. . . . [T]he ‘weary weaponising of white women’s tears.’ ” (quoting About
the Weary Weaponizing of White Women Tears, AWESOMELY LUVVIE (Apr. 17, 2018),
https://www.awesomelyluvvie.com/2018/04/weaponizing-white-women-tears.html
[https://perma.cc/9W6W-S34P])).
19 . See, e .g ., Jones-Rogers, p. xiv; SCOTT, supra note 5; GLYMPH, supra note 12;
SUZANNE LEBSOCK, THE FREE WOMEN OF PETERSBURG: STATUS AND CULTURE IN A SOUTHERN
TOWN, 1784–1860 (1984).
20. 368 U.S. 57, 61–62 (1961).
21. 335 U.S. 464 (1948).
22. 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 130 (1873).
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Black women and girls. It examines Harriet Jacobs’s Incidents in the Life of a
Slave Girl as a case study in American chattel slavery, as she and the women
in her family were female owned. It further substantiates and contextualizes
this Review’s account of white women as holders and traders in human
bondage.
Part III offers a more complex view of white women during the nation’s
founding and specifically the antebellum period. It brings to light slavehold-
ing white women in the business and management of human capital. In their
diaries, they confessed frustrations, anger, and stress, as well as joy at the
birth of new slaves by whom they would profit.23 Even as such historical ac-
counts suffer for lack of nuance regarding sexual violence on slaveholding
estates, the record of white women as capitalist businesswomen engaged in
the enterprise of slavery becomes abundantly clear.
Recording this history of white women purchasing, leasing, holding, in-
heriting, disputing, and bequeathing enslaved Black people offers two im-
portant lanes of exploration and insight. First, it disputes prior accounts that
dismissed white women’s involvement in capitalism generally and human
commodification specifically, which problematically placed them outside the
margins of slavery and their own histories. Second, by strong implication, it
shows that nineteenth- and twentieth-century jurisprudence disempowering
women from voting, serving on juries, and becoming lawyers reflected pa-
ternalist norms baked into law by men for the purposes of honing and pre-
serving male power.
History exposes with clarity how male Supreme Court justices (and
those on lower courts) enshrined misogyny in law, conveniently erasing
from the historical legal record white women’s business engagement with
capitalism and slavery. Equally, as their jurisprudence time and again re-
vealed, justices ignored the historic, diverse labor of Black women and wom-
en of color in their expressed sophistry that women were destined for quaint
domestic duties—as this for centuries had not been the role expected of
Black women.24 Indeed, the first female firefighter in the United States, Mol-
ly Williams, was an enslaved Black woman. She fought fires before New
York’s fire department existed.25
23 . See, e .g ., Diary of Lucilla McCorkle (July 1, 1846) (on file with the Southern Histori-
cal Collection, University of North Carolina Chapel Hill) (“My heart has been heavy with do-
mestic care this week. . . . I fear I have not made due allowance for native depurity, nor for real
bodily ailments. Business negligently done and much altogether neglected - some disobedience
enough to identify [that] sullenness, slovenliness . . . be in him apart from respect, though in-
consistent with it.”).
24 . See Hoyt, 368 U.S. 57; Bradwell, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 130.
25. Michele Goodwin, The Thirteenth Amendment: Modern Slavery, Capitalism, and
Mass Incarceration, 104 CORNELL L. REV. 899, 904 (2019); Ginger Adams Otis, Molly Williams,
a Black Woman and a Slave, Fought Fires Years Before the FDNY Was Formed Was a Pioneer
for Fellow Female Smoke-Eaters, N.Y. DAILY NEWS (Apr. 26, 2015), http://www.nydailynews
.com/new-york/woman-slave-molly-williams-fought-fires-early-1800s-article-1.2197868
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I. SLAVERY FROM A DIFFERENT POINT OF VIEW
Incidents in the Life of a Slave Girl and They Were Her Property tell a
powerful American story even though published nearly 160 years apart. Be-
yond a doubt, the stories they record should be all too familiar and well
known: the terrifying horror of American slavery, including kidnapping,
confinement, coercion, rape, and torture.26 These were the common markers
of chattel slavery throughout the United States,27 especially in the American
South, as reported in newspapers,28 abolitionist pamphlets,29 daguerreo-
types,30 and autobiographies,31 including some written by slaveholders—who
[https://perma.cc/NT6B-8F5X] (“Molly Williams fought fires in the city even before the FDNY
was organized 150 years ago.”).
26. See generally THE DEVIL’S LANE: SEX AND RACE IN THE EARLY SOUTH (Catherine
Clinton & Michele Gillespie eds., 1997) (addressing the rape and torture of Black women on
plantations); RICHARD C. WADE, SLAVERY IN THE CITIES: THE SOUTH, 1820–1860 (1964) (de-
tailing accounts of urban slave life in the southern cities, expanding the lens on American slav-
ery beyond life for enslaved Blacks on plantations); SLAVERY’S CAPITALISM: A NEW HISTORY
OF AMERICAN ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT (Sven Beckert & Seth Rockman eds., 2016); ROBERT
WILLIAM FOGEL & STANLEY L. ENGERMAN, TIME ON THE CROSS: THE ECONOMICS OF
AMERICAN NEGRO SLAVERY (1974); WILLIAM H. HARRIS, THE HARDER WE RUN: BLACK
WORKERS SINCE THE CIVIL WAR (1982) (articulating the nexus of racial discrimination during
slavery extending to Jim Crow); JOHN W. BLASSINGAME, THE SLAVE COMMUNITY:
PLANTATION LIFE IN THE ANTEBELLUM SOUTH (1972) (chronicling the myriad hardships and
abuses enslaved Blacks encountered in the antebellum South).
27. Goodwin, supra note 25, at 914–19.
28. The Slave-Trade Still Prosperous, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 1, 1860, at 4 (“For more than half
a century this odious commerce has withstood the denunciations of successive philanthropists;
the proscriptive legislation of mighty States; the incessant surveillance, and destructive attacks
of hostile squadrons—yet it is still prosperous, still flourishing.”); The Issue in the United
States—the North and Slavery, LONDON DAILY NEWS, reprinted in N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 18, 1860, at
2 (“The man who holds his fellow-man in slavery, treats him as a chattel, breeds from him with
as little regard for marriage ties as if he were an animal, is a moral outlaw; society may find, or
fancy it finds, its interest in protecting his life and his ‘property’ but it does so at its own peril.
Before long a certain retribution overtakes it. In all ages of the world men have acknowledged
rights which are older than civil society, and immutable . . . .”); The United States and the Slave-
Trade, LONDON POST, Sept. 7, 1860, reprinted in N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 22, 1860, at 1.
29. The Library of Congress offers a collection of antislavery almanacs, newspapers, da-
guerreotypes, and other materials, including illustrations. See The African-American Mosaic:
Influence of Prominent Abolitionists, LIB. CONG., https://www.loc.gov/exhibits/african/afam006
.html [https://perma.cc/Q7AA-8NHC]; see also ANTI-SLAVERY TRACTS. FIRST SERIES, NOS. 1-
20 (New York, Am. Anti-Slavery Soc’y 1855–1856).
30. The daguerreotype of Anthony Burns provides a particularly illustrative view into
American slavery, as it maps his childhood, escape from slavery, life in Boston, capture, and
return to slavery. The drawing captures slavery’s tragic reach in the North, its cruelty in the
South, and the horrific influences of fugitive slave laws in preserving slavery. See Illustration of
Fugitive Slave Anthony Burns Drawn from a Daguerreotype, LIB. CONG., www.loc.gov
/item/2003689280/ [https://perma.cc/L8DP-53M4].
31. Among some of the better known are SOLOMON NORTHUP, TWELVE YEARS A SLAVE
(David Wilson ed., Auburn, Derby & Miller 1853); FREDERICK DOUGLASS, NARRATIVE OF THE
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proudly engaged in such enterprise.32 Despite robust contemporary debates
as to what year best marks the start of the enterprise of American slavery—
1619 versus the 1500s—what is clear is that slavery was a centuries-old en-
terprise, resulting in the dramatic expansion of capital33 and laws that facili-
tated the steady flow of Black bodies into what would become the United
States.34
Notwithstanding the compelling historical, feminist, and legal contribu-
tions of Harriet Jacobs’s 1861 autobiography, law students over the past 160
years would be forgiven for never having heard of her, the suffering that she
and millions of women like her endured at the hands of white women and
men committed to the lucrative enterprises of slavery, or her bravery in es-
caping and penning a classic autobiography. She, like millions of others, es-
pecially women similarly situated during slavery, is invisible in her own
narrative.
Law professors skip over the crucial ways in which slavery is linked to
and foundational to first-year law classes ranging from property to criminal
law, instead musing over Pierson v . Post35 as the early American legal case of
property, when Brakkee v . Lovell,36 Brom and Bett v . Ashley,37 Quock Walker
v . Jennison,38 and Guardian of Sally v . Beaty39 already represented cases in
property: human property. Even though the earliest legal disputes involving
criminal law, contracts, constitutional law, civil procedure, torts, family law,
and property (in the land that would become the United States) involved ar-
guments over who owned, leased, and held rights in Black bodies, casebooks
largely render enslaved persons invisible, incidental, and nonessential to the
American legal story.
LIFE OF FREDERICK DOUGLASS (Belknap Press of the Harvard Univ. Press) (1853); and Jacobs’s
Incidents.
32 . See, e .g ., THOMAS JEFFERSON, NOTES ON THE STATE OF VIRGINIA 143 (William
Peden ed., Univ. of N.C. Press 1996) (1785) (“I advance it therefore as a suspicion only, that the
blacks, whether originally a distinct race, or made distinct by time and circumstances, are infe-
rior to the whites in the endowments both of body and mind. . . . This unfortunate difference
of colour, and perhaps of faculty, is a powerful obstacle to the emancipation of these people.”).
33. SLAVERY’S CAPITALISM, supra note 26, at 12.
34 . See Mary Elliott & Jazmine Hughes, A Brief History of Slavery that You Didn’t Learn
in School, N.Y. TIMES MAG. (Aug. 19, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2019/08/19
/magazine/history-slavery-smithsonian.html [https://perma.cc/3TLL-8LVZ].
35 . 3 Cai. 175 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1805).
36. BENJAMIN H. HALL, HISTORY OF EASTERN VERMONT, FROM ITS EARLIEST
SETTLEMENT TO THE CLOSE OF THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY 331 n.† (1858); Patchwork Free-
dom, UNIV. VT. (Jan. 29, 2014), https://www.uvm.edu/uvmnews/news/patchwork-freedom
[https://perma.cc/DRJ8-7W39].
37 . Mumbet Court Records, ELIZABETH FREEMAN, https://elizabethfreeman.mumbet
.com/who-is-mumbet/mumbet-court-records [https://perma.cc/U24E-E84N].
38 . The Quock Walker Case: “Instructions to the Jury,” PBS, https://www.pbs.org/wgbh
/aia/part2/2h38.html [https://perma.cc/L2N8-WBKD].
39. 1 S.C.L. (1 Bay) 260 (1792).
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These gaps in teaching from a broader historical legal record undoubt-
edly limit how students who later become practitioners of law come to un-
derstand that the earliest contracts and property disputes in these lands
involved slavery.40 Courts debated complicated rules of law deeply inter-
twined with slavery: generally, it was not illegal to harm or even kill your
own slave, but if you leased a slave, were you still entitled to inflict injury on
another’s property?41 If an enslaved woman escaped with her children, was
this an act of larceny or theft?42 Jurisdictional struggles ensued between
courts regarding whose authority defined the law on a formerly enslaved
Black person in a city or town, leading famously to the Supreme Court’s de-
cisions in Ableman v . Booth43 and United States v . Booth.44 Was an enslaved
person still so after escape; were they property or person?
Equally, because the matter of sexual abuse and violence against Black
women and girls was so frequent and common, legislatures sought to resolve
parentage and legal status with alacrity. Was the offspring of a white man and
an enslaved Black woman free or enslaved? Early American law answered this
question with painful clarity: offspring would take the status of their en-
slaved mothers, which further tied capitalism to rape, embedding a horrific
practice into the culture of southern economics.45
In addition, in sorting out questions of criminal law, was the murder of
an enslaved Black person a criminal offense? There, too, legislatures acted
with haste and precision:
40 . See, e .g ., State v. Mann, 13 N.C. (2 Dev.) 263, 263 (1829).
41 . Id .
42 . See Julius Yanuck, The Garner Fugitive Slave Case, 40 MISS. VALLEY HIST. REV. 47
(1953); see also Rebecca Carroll, Overlooked: Margaret Garner, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 31, 2019),
https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2019/obituaries/margaret-garner-overlooked.html
[https://perma.cc/8428-8X5P].
43. 62 U.S. (21 How.) 506 (1859) (querying whether the Wisconsin Supreme Court had
the authority to issue writs of habeas corpus for the release of Sherman Booth, an abolitionist
who aided in the escape of Joshua Glover, a “runaway slave,” held in federal custody in Wis-
consin and ruling that it did not) .
44. 59 U.S. (18 How.) 476 (1856).
45. In 1662, the Virginia Grand Assembly enacted one of its first “slave laws” to settle
this point, expressing,
Whereas some doubts have arrisen whether children got by any Englishman upon a ne-
gro woman should be slave or free, Be it therefore enacted and declared by this present
grand assembly, that all children borne in this country shalbe held bond or free only ac-
cording to the condition of the mother, And that if any christian shall committ fornica-
tion with a negro man or woman, hee or shee soe offending shall pay double the fines
imposed by the former act.
Act XII, reprinted in THE STATUTES AT LARGE; BEING A COLLECTION OF ALL THE LAWS OF
VIRGINIA 170 (William Waller Hening ed., New York, R., W. & G. Bartow 1823); see also id . at
260, 266, 270.
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[I]f any slave resist[s] his master (or other by his masters order correcting
him) and by the extremity of the correction should chance to die, that his
death shall not be [accounted a felony], but the master (or that other per-
son appointed by the master to punish him) be acquit from molestation,
since it cannot be presumed that [premeditated] malice (which alone
makes [murder a felony]) should induce any man to destroy his owne es-
tate.46
Fugitive slave laws of 1793 and 1850 were early examples of interstate
commerce regulations. Exhilarant on an already raging fire, they legalized an
enterprise whereby nonelite, white bounty hunters and “slave catchers” trav-
eled to northern states and territories to hunt Black people who, by skill and
wit, escaped.47 It was not unusual that by threats of death and clever means
bounty hunters kidnapped Black children, women, and men who had never
been enslaved.48
States enacted laws mandating Black people carry documents or “passes”
proving that their “owners” granted permission for them to be in public
spaces, such as along a road or in town. The origins of police, “police pa-
trols,” and policing emerge from slavery.49 Police-patrol violence emerges
from the culture of slavery. Failure to produce a pass could result in severe
physical punishment by the local slave police patrol. Children and women
46 . Id . at 270 (cleaned up).
47. WADE, supra note 26, at 218, 227 (detailing accounts of slave life in the southern
cities, diversifying the literature on slavery, and expanding beyond research of enslaved Blacks’
lives on plantations).
48 . See, e .g ., Prigg v . Pennsylvania, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 539, 543 (1842); see also RICHARD
BELL, STOLEN: FIVE FREE BOYS KIDNAPPED INTO SLAVERY AND THEIR ASTONISHING ODYSSEY
HOME (2019).
49. In North Carolina, where Jacobs was enslaved, ordinances like the following were
not uncommon:
1st. Patrols shall be appointed, at least four in each Captain’s district.
2d. It shall be their duty, for two of their number, at least, to patrol their respective
districts once in every week; in failure thereof, they shall be subject to the penalties pre-
scribed by law.
3d. They shall have power to inflict corporal punishment, if two be present agreeing
thereto.
4th. One patroller shall have power to seize any negro slave who behaves insolently to
a patroller, or otherwise unlawfully or suspiciously; and hold such slave in custody until
he can bring together a requisite number of Patrollers to act in the business.
5th. Previous to entering on their duties, Patrols shall call on some acting magistrate,
and take the following oath, to wit: “I, A. B. appointed one of the Patrol by the County
Court of Rowan, for Captain B’s company, do hereby swear, that I will faithfully execute
the duties of a Patroller, to the best of my ability, according to law and the regulations of
the County Court.[”]
PATROL REGULATIONS FOR THE COUNTY OF ROWAN (Salisbury, Philo White 1825), reprinted
in DOCUMENTING AM. S. (2001), https://docsouth.unc.edu/nc/rowan/rowan.html [https://
perma.cc/D8QK-SLWG].
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were not spared. In his 1857 memoir, Austin Steward detailed early police
violence. He recounts:
Slaves are never allowed to leave the plantation to which they belong, with-
out a written pass. Should any one venture to disobey this law, he will most
likely be caught by the patrol and given thirty-nine lashes. This patrol is al-
ways on duty every Sunday, going to each plantation under their supervi-
sion, entering every slave cabin, and examining closely the conduct of the
slaves; and if they find one slave from another plantation without a pass, he
is immediately punished with a severe flogging.50
Substantively, students may learn about the infamous Dred Scott opin-
ion, in which Chief Justice Roger Taney claimed:
[Black slaves] had for more than a century before been regarded as beings
of an inferior order, and altogether unfit to associate with the white race, ei-
ther in social or political relations; and so far inferior, that they had no
rights which the white man was bound to respect; and that the negro might
justly and lawfully be reduced to slavery for his benefit. He was bought and
sold, and treated as an ordinary article of merchandise and traffic, whenev-
er a profit could be made by it.51
Despite the importance of Dred Scott to canons of law beyond constitu-
tional law, such as contracts, property, civil procedure, criminal law, and
even feminist jurisprudence, the case receives relatively little attention. Fur-
ther, though the Supreme Court’s decision and most attention surrounding
the case focuses on Mr. Scott, he also sought to free his wife and daughters.52
Their underlying claims to freedom also pass uncontested through the an-
nals of American law. One reason for the obscurity may be the Court’s stun-
ning claim that it lacked jurisdiction over the matter because Mr. Scott and
his family were not citizens of the United States, but rather slaves.53 Interest-
ingly, Justice Taney and fellow justices did not bother to test this notion
against Scott’s daughter who was born at sea, not in a slave state.54 Even so,
little of a law student’s education in the United States engages slavery.
50. AUSTIN STEWARD, TWENTY-TWO YEARS A SLAVE AND FORTY YEARS A FREEMAN 10
(Syracuse Univ. Press 2002) (1857) (emphasis omitted).
51. Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 407 (1857). History marks Justice
Taney’s opinion as uncharitable and regrettable, but it did not tarnish his reputation. His bust
still sits in the halls of Congress.
52 . Id . at 457 (Nelson, J., concurring) (“The suit was brought in court below by the
plaintiff, for the purpose of asserting his freedom, and that of Harriet, his wife, and two chil-
dren.”).
53 . Id . at 406 (majority opinion).
54 . See id . at 398.
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II. SLAVERY AS THE ORIGINAL #METOO
As Jacobs and Jones-Rogers show, and countless records teach us, slav-
ery itself was the horrible practice of human trafficking and kidnapping, alt-
hough not described as such by those who practiced and profited from it.
This legacy marks society as much as it marred Black bodies. For example, a
recent study55 focusing on the genetics of slavery reveals that “the brutal
treatment of enslaved people has shaped the DNA of their descendants” such
that it further confirms “one of the darkest chapters of world history, in
which 12.5 million people were forcibly taken from their homelands in tens
of thousands of European ships.”56 The study’s authors grapple with their
troubling findings, particularly as the DNA of African Americans also re-
veals centuries of sexual violence and rape of Black women by white men.57
Rapes were so extensive in the United States by white men that they “con-
tributed three times more to the modern-day gene pool of people of African
descent than European women did.”58
For these reasons, Ms. Jacobs’s autobiography is particularly relevant
and important: it disrupts the common chronicles of slavery in two distinct
ways, as if plucking a scab and offering a look at what festers beneath it. First,
the autobiography disturbs the common, gendered framing of American
slavery, which casts slave owning as a white male enterprise not only in soci-
ety but also in law. Instead, Harriet Jacobs exposes white women as common
legal participants in the owning, leasing, and bequeathing of slaves.59 Second,
the autobiography is disruptive in that it narrates slavery from the perspec-
tive of an enslaved Black girl and later woman. Reconfiguring the landscape
of slavery in this way makes visible the overlooked central cast in the saga of
slavery—namely, enslaved children, women, and men—not as objects or
others but as complex human beings caught within a lawless system.
Substantively, examining slavery through a gendered lens also rereads
women beyond stereotypes and caricatures articulated by men. Doing so
through a Black woman’s lens in this case further enhances our view into es-
tates and plantations in which slavery was the standard way of life, making
55. Steven J. Micheletti et al., Genetic Consequences of the Transatlantic Slave Trade in
the Americas, 107 AM. J. HUM. GENETICS 265 (2020).
56. Christine Kenneally, Large DNA Study Traces Violent History of American Slavery,
N.Y. TIMES (July 23, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/07/23/science/23andme-african-
ancestry.html [https://perma.cc/3RR7-LUPM].
57 . Id .
58 . Id . In the Caribbean, the rate of white male carnage on Black women is borne out in
DNA evidence; they contributed “25 times more” to the modern-day gene pool of Black people
in the British Caribbean. There are social and political reasons that explain these differences,
including that white women generally did not settle the Caribbean whereas they did settle in
what would become the United States. See Cecily Jones, Contesting the Boundaries of Gender,
Race and Sexuality in Barbadian Plantation Society, 12 WOMEN’S HIST. REV. 195, 207 (2003).
59 . See Jacobs, p. 8.
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visible norms that were either overlooked in negligence or by intent. Like ad-
justing the lens on a microscope or binoculars, we gain a better view and un-
derstanding of both Black and white women. Why is this important?
Accounts of white historians rarely center Black women. For example,
when Professor Elizabeth Fox-Genovese writes of Black women in Within
the Plantation Household: Black and White Women of the Old South, she
hastily dispenses with discussions of slavery’s key features: sexual violence
and rape committed against Black girls and women.60 She writes that while
“[t]he white men were not saints . . . slave women who worked in the fields
were clothed scantily, with skirts hitched above their knees.”61 Arguably,
through this lens, Black women and girls were blameworthy or co-
conspirators in the American conditions of enslavement, from rape to the
inadequate clothing they were provided to the insufferably hot and musty
conditions of picking cotton and field labor.
Similarly, Anne Firor Scott’s The Southern Lady: From Pedestal to Poli-
tics, 1830–1930 offers important insights relating to slavery, from marriage
and work to the Civil War and suffrage. The book copiously details white
women’s direct involvement with owning and managing enslaved Black
people. The author combs through countless letters, diary entries, and other
communications.62 She provides a narrative foundation that ultimately sup-
ports the conclusions drawn in Jones-Rogers’s They Were Her Property and
this Review. Yet, the book renders Black girls and women invisible even as
they are central to the southern (white) lady’s life (as cooks, cleaners, wet
nurses, field laborers, house laborers, and objects of their husbands’ preda-
tions).
In chapter two, “The Reality: Love, Marriage, Work, and Family Life,”63
Firor Scott writes about white women and “miserable” marriages, filled with
“grief and regret,” including disappointments related to a lack of emotional
commitment from their husbands, unhappiness, and sexual discomforts.64 In
a later chapter, she capture’s white women’s “discontent.”65 She explains that
a key factor to white women’s discontent and anger was the complex rela-
tionship to slaves, encompassing “marriage, family life, and sexual mo-
res . . . defined by the patriarchal doctrine.”66 She describes how some white
women sought emotional and religious refuge to escape their troubling mar-
riages.67
60. FOX-GENOVESE, supra note 18, at 49.
61. Id . at 189.
62. SCOTT, supra note 5, at xii.
63. Id . at 22–44.
64. Id . at 40; id . at 11 (“There are references to sins too awful even to be recorded in a
private journal, accompanied by allusions to cold hearts.”).
65. Id . at 45–79.
66. Id . at 46 (“For women, . . . slaves were a troublesome property.”).
67. Id . at 11–14.
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Glaringly absent is nuanced analysis about marital misery as it relates to
slavery, adultery, and sexual assaults committed on Black girls and women.
After all, sexual predations and pedophilia in a spouse would reasonably
trigger unhappiness, disappointment, dissatisfaction, and even rage. That
said, these matters, which are central to social, legal, and cultural politics of
slavery, are virtually hidden from view. Firor Scott refers to white women’s
discontent with “miscegenation” as a “grievance,” but not rape and sexual
assault of the hapless victims.68 What becomes clear from the record Firor
Scott amasses is that enslaved Black women were perceived as sexual inter-
lopers, “prostitutes,” and members of “a hideous black harem” rather than
disempowered victims of both the white women and men who claimed own-
ership of them.69
By contrast, Jacobs’s powerful testimonials (directly and indirectly af-
firmed by others)70 speak clearly to what historians of the white female expe-
rience during slavery avoided or seemingly rendered unnoteworthy.71 Like
the literal excavation of Sally Hemings’s existence at Monticello in recent
years,72 more than 150 years ago, Harriet Jacobs exhumed and deftly report-
ed on the hidden horrors of Black girls’ experiences, some of which was al-
ready visible on the faces of enslaved children who resembled their white fa-
fathers.
Jacobs describes being owned as a young girl in North Carolina by a rel-
atively benign, older white woman, Margaret Horniblow (Jacobs, p. 7 & n.9).
Margaret—who had also owned Jacobs’s mother before her premature
68. Id . at 54.
69. Id . at 52 (“Under slavery we live surrounded by prostitutes . . . like patriarchs of old,
our men live in one house with their wives and concubines. . . . Any lady is ready to tell you
who is the father of all the mulatto children in everybody’s household but her own.” (quoting
Mary Chestnut)).
70. For example, Professor Jean Fagan Yellin, one of the nation’s leading scholars on the
literature of slavery, spent more than six years confirming the very accounts documented by
Jacobs, reading the letters sent by Jacobs to abolitionists (found at the University of Rochester),
searching through archives in North Carolina, and more to corroborate the memoir. Jean Fa-
gan Yellin, Preface to Jacobs, pp. vii–viii.
71. Jean Fagan Yellin, Introduction to Jacobs, pp. xv (“Newly found documents make it
possible to trace Harriet Jacobs’s life, to establish her authorship of Incidents, and to identify
the people and places she presented pseudonymously in her book.”).
72. For nearly two centuries, most white historians wrote Sally Hemings (an enslaved
Black teenager and then adult) out of Thomas Jefferson’s life—as a subject of his gaze and pre-
dations—even though she mothered six of his children, traveled to France with him, and slept
in a windowless chamber next to his. At some point, her existence was literally papered over as
managers of his estate converted her bedroom into a men’s bathroom, quite literally micturat-
ing on her very existence. See Farah Stockman, Monticello Is Done Avoiding Jefferson’s Rela-
tionship with Sally Hemings, N.Y. TIMES (June 16, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018
/06/16/us/sally-hemings-exhibit-monticello.html [https://perma.cc/8FPT-WB26] (“The newly
opened space at Monticello, Thomas Jefferson’s palatial mountaintop plantation, is presented
as the living quarters of Sally Hemings, an enslaved woman who bore the founding father’s
children. But it is more than an exhibit.”).
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death—instructs young Harriet in reading, spelling, and writing, which laws
prohibited in many slave states.73 Horniblow is described as relatively benev-
olent, such that Jacobs convinces herself that one day she will be manumitted
by her (Jacobs, p. 7). Indeed, Ms. Horniblow promises Harriet’s dying moth-
er “that her children should never suffer for any thing . . . . But, alas! [W]e all
know that the memory of a faithful slave does not avail much to save her
children from the auction block” (Jacobs, p. 7).
Instead, Harriet experiences the profundity of American law and the
system it supported: slavery holds no compassion or moral exemptions for
children. They, too, carry the burden of being commonly traded goods of no
higher moral, social, or legal standing than cattle in the fields, domesticated
animals, or household items.74 This disruptive and cruel awakening visits
Harriet at twelve years old when Margaret Horniblow dies, bequeathing
Harriet to her five-year-old niece. As Ms. Jacobs recounts:
She possessed but few slaves; and at her death those were all distributed
among her relatives. Five of them were my grandmother’s children, and
had shared the same milk that nourished her mother’s children. Notwith-
73. Jacobs, pp. 6–7, 6 n.8; see, e .g ., VA. CODE tit. 54, ch. 198, § 32 (1849) (“If a white per-
son assemble with negroes for the purpose of instructing them to read or write, or if he associ-
ate with them in an unlawful assembly, he shall be confined in jail not exceeding six months
and fined not exceeding one hundred dollars . . . .”). See also Act of 1831, ch. VI, 1831 N.C.
SESS. LAWS 11, which reads:
An act to prevent all persons from teaching slaves to read or write, the use of figures ex-
cepted:
Whereas the teaching of slaves to read and write, has a tendency to excite dissatisfaction
in their minds and to produce insurrection and rebellion, to the manifest injury of the
citizens of this State: Therefore,
Be it enacted by the General Assembly of the State of North Carolina, and it is hereby en-
acted by the authority of the same, That any free person, who shall hereafter teach, or at-
tempt to teach, any slave within this State to read or write, the use of figures excepted,
or shall give or sell to such slave or slaves any books or pamphlets, shall be liable to in-
dictment in any court of record in this State having jurisdiction thereof; and upon con-
viction, shall, at the discretion of the court, if a white man or woman, be fined not less
than one hundred dollars, nor more than two hundred dollars, or imprisoned; and if a
free person of color, shall be fined, imprisoned, or whipped, at the discretion of the
court, not exceeding thirty nine lashes, nor less than twenty lashes.
II. Be it further enacted, That if any slave shall hereafter teach, or attempt to teach, any
other slave to read or write, the use of figures excepted, he or she may be carried before
any justice of the peace, and on conviction thereof, shall be sentenced to receive thirty
nine lashes on his or her bare back[.]
III. Be it further enacted, That the judges of the Superior Courts and the justices of the
County Courts shall give this act in charge to the grand jurors of their respective coun-
ties.
See also Important for the Future, HARPER’S WKLY., June 21, 1862, at 386 (“The law of 1830 in
North Carolina forbids all persons to teach ‘slaves’ to read or write.”).
74 . See Jacobs, p. 7.
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standing my grandmother’s long and faithful service to her owners, not one
of her children escaped the auction block. (Jacobs, p. 8)
Ms. Jacobs and her female relatives were all owned by white women:
Harriet’s mother and her grandmother (Jacobs, pp. 6–8). Harriet’s mother
and Margaret Horniblow both nursed at her grandmother’s breasts and
played together in childhood.75 This, too, was not uncommon on estates and
plantations. Yet, hierarchy was never disrupted, and that became startlingly
clear as playmates grew older and roles took shape. Indeed, these relation-
ships were not uncomplicated, such as gaining legal dominion over one’s
playmate.
Being owned by a five-year-old presented additional challenges. Harriet
had no protection from her owner’s licentious father, Dr. Flint, who, alt-
hough forty years senior to Harriet and an esteemed local doctor, made ex-
plicit his desire to sexually assault and rape her (Jacobs, Chapter Five). In a
chapter titled “The Trials of Girlhood,” she describes the complicated effort
to stay safe, avoid the wrath and jealousy of Mrs. Flint, and stay beyond
reach of Dr. Flint—while a girl herself (Jacobs, pp. 27–28). She writes, “I saw
a man forty years my senior daily violating the most sacred commandments
of nature. He told me I was his property; that I must be subject to his will in
all things” (Jacobs, p. 27; footnote omitted).
Relevantly, she notes, “there is no shadow of law to protect [Black girls]
from insult, from violence, or even from death; all these are inflicted by
fiends who bear the shape of men” (Jacobs, p. 27). As she turns fifteen, she
explains that it marks “a sad epoch in the life of a slave girl” as they soon be-
come sexual chattel (Jacobs, p. 27). Indeed, to comprehend the banality of
rape as part of the American slave experience is to understand that Dr. Flint
was also the father to at least eleven other enslaved Black people (Jacobs,
p. 35). Focusing the lens of slavery on a Black girl’s experience, Jacobs tells
us, “[s]he listens to violent outbreaks of jealous passion, and cannot help un-
derstanding what is the cause. She will become prematurely knowing in evil
things. Soon she will learn to tremble when she hears her master’s footfall”
(Jacobs, p. 28).
Harriet’s grandmother, after securing her own liberty, made numerous
attempts to purchase her granddaughter’s freedom to no avail (Jacobs, p. 35).
The grandmother’s concerns were rooted in her personal knowledge about
the predatory nature of slavery. Girls barely beyond childhood became tar-
gets for sex and breeding, which was true in Harriet’s case. As white men
placed their mixed-race offspring for sale at auction, they literally engaged in
creating capital out of slavery (Jacobs, p. 55). In response to the offers made
by Harriet’s grandmother to purchase her freedom, Dr. Flint frequently re-
sponded that the matter was beyond his control. He claimed, Harriet “does
75. Jacobs, pp. 6–7 (“In fact, my mother had been weaned at three months old, that the
babe of the mistress might obtain sufficient food[ ]. . . when they became women, my mother
was a most faithful servant to her whiter foster sister.”).
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not belong to me. She is my daughter’s property, and I have no legal right to
sell her” (Jacobs, p. 35). The irony of evoking law in such instances speaks to
the duplicity of slavery.
Sexual assault on Black girls in antebellum life is also the story of white
women’s rage, violence, disappointment, and victimization in adulterous re-
lationships.76 As Jacobs explains, “[e]ven the little child, who is accustomed
to wait on her mistress and her children, will learn, before she is twelve years
old, why it is that her mistress hates” particular enslaved Black women—and
muse that “[p]erhaps the child’s own mother is among those hated ones”
(Jacobs, p. 28). In Harriet’s case, although a child, she becomes the target of
Mrs. Flint’s loathing and rage. What Mrs. Flint could not inflict on her hus-
band, she cowardly wreaked on Harriet (Jacobs, pp. 32–34).
What in other accounts of antebellum history is described as hardened,
distanced institutional management of the estate or plantation’s affairs—
including inflicting physical punishment—from a detached, objective point
of view, Jacobs reveals as personal, emotional, and intentional. Whether spit-
ting in every kettle after a meal so that the cook and her family could not eat
the meager remaining morsels (Jacobs, p. 12), or retaliating in the forms of
whippings, brining, or selling off slaves who dared verbalize contempt at be-
ing commodified, exploited, and raped, white women who owned enslaved
Black people could be as calculating and cruel as the men in their lives. These
were not arm’s-length transactions but rather intimate operations in the
slave economy.
III. WHITE WOMEN AND THE HUMAN PROPERTY THEY KEPT
Incidents in the Life of a Slave Girl provides a crucial foundation for cor-
recting impressions and assumptions baked into social understanding that
slavery was exclusively or even primarily controlled and governed by men.
They Were Her Property: White Women as Slave Owners in the American
South further advances that record. Both works expose the intentional in-
volvement of white women—not as proximate investors to their husbands
and fathers. Nor as passive, unaware subordinates. Instead, they disrupt the
common narratives of slavery that careful readers of that history thought
they already knew: white women were slave owners too. As such, they, too,
are implicated not only in the social constructions of slavery but also in its
legal story.
A. The Master’s Power: Rethinking Slavery from a Gendered Perspective
Professor Jones-Rogers reminds us that in the instances when historians
have portrayed the authority that white women wielded over enslaved peo-
ple, they typically framed this involvement as “obligatory, rather than volun-
76 . See, e .g ., Jacobs, pp. 27–28.
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tary or self-initiated, management and discipline of enslaved people” (Jones-
Rogers, p. xii). Such writers of history claim that white women were only
“fictive masters” (Jones-Rogers, p. xii), as if the transgressions they commit-
ted could only be viewed through the imagination rather than reality. Jones-
Rogers critiques the assumption that these capable women “did not relish
their power” (Jones-Rogers, p. xii). As Professor Jones-Rogers notes, even
scholars who examine slavery, acknowledging white women’s skills, desire to
work, and interest in profit, typically find that they lacked a “master’s” power
(Jones-Rogers, pp. xii, xvii). They portray the authority by which white
women wielded the whip (or imposed on someone else to lift it) as by de-
grees different than that of white male counterparts or suggest “that slave-
owning women’s acts of violence differed from those of slave-owning men”
(Jones-Rogers, p. xii).
Professor Jones-Rogers builds upon these accounts, but her authoritative
study dramatically differs from them. For example, she concentrates her ex-
amination on women who owned enslaved people outright—not as shared
or joint property (Jones-Rogers, p. xii). She also centers her research on
white women’s relationship “to slavery as a relation of property . . . that was,
above all, economic at its foundation” (Jones-Rogers, p. xiii). The value of
this shifted research lens where the aperture opens on women’s economic
investment in slavery is that it informs the “process of nation-making”
(Jones-Rogers, p. xiii).
Provocative questions emerge from this critical reexamination of Amer-
ican slavery from a gendered lens. Namely, “if we considered the very real
possibility that some of the enslaved people . . . men compelled to work in
southern cotton fields actually belonged to their wives,” how might the
American story of capitalism be understood and rewritten? (Jones-Rogers,
p. xiii). Might it be, as Jones-Rogers queries, “strikingly different?” (Jones-
Rogers, p. xiii). Understanding, as the history of American capitalism teach-
es us, that “slave-grown cotton was the most valuable export made in Ameri-
ca,”77 how then might we rethink white women’s roles in building the
nation’s capital and their desire, if not economic hunger, to maintain the in-
ternational slave trade?78
Further, Jones-Rogers counters accounts that southern white women
were repulsed by slavery. She writes, “[w]omen could examine enslaved peo-
ple’s bodies . . . [and] [i]f what they saw piqued their interest, they could en-
ter the trader’s establishment and be assured that the proprietor would cater
to their needs” (Jones-Rogers, p. 131). She concludes this passage by noting
that white southern women were neither “repulsed or alienated from slave
markets” nor “ignorant of the details of slave transactions” (Jones-Rogers,
p. 131).
77. SVEN BECKERT & SETH ROCKMAN, INTRODUCTION, in SLAVERY’S CAPITALISM, supra
note 26, at 1, 1.
78 . See Jones-Rogers, pp. 130–32.
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Jones-Rogers explains that “[r]esidential and business directories and
censuses of merchants show that hundreds of women conducted business in
the same places where slave traders plied their trade” (Jones-Rogers, p. 132).
In other words, not only were white women slave owners; they also built
businesses adjacent to slavery, such as retail shops, restaurants, and other
businesses near auction houses that traded in kidnapped and enslaved Black
people, further demonstrating their sophistication in building slavery-related
capital. History could suggest that these women were crafty at following the
wealth generated by men. However, Jones-Rogers writes, “The directories
also show that female merchants outnumbered individuals who identified
themselves as slave traders in the commercial center of [New Orleans],
thereby suggesting that these men were locating their businesses in proximi-
ty to the female merchants” (Jones-Rogers, p. 132).
Despite the invisibility of white women to modern accounts of antebel-
lum slavery, records show that “[t]he slave market offered a range of possi-
bilities for white women” (Jones-Rogers, p. 149). The economic stability and
wealth generated by slavery “brought [white women] wealth that they would
not have accumulated otherwise” (Jones-Rogers, p. 149). Jones-Rogers offers
a powerful critique. Slave owning women “had an immense economic stake
in the continued enslavement of African Americans, and they struggled to
find ways to preserve the system when the Civil War threatened to destroy
the institution of slavery and their wealth along with it” (Jones-Rogers,
p. 150).
Indeed, even as efforts to stem the kidnapping and importation of slaves
were enacted into law, such efforts were not taken seriously. For example,
Congress enacted the 1807 Act Prohibiting Importation of Slaves.79 Howev-
er, as an 1860 New York Times article reported, “The laws are on the statute-
book, and anybody who likes to obey them may do so; but any one who does
not like to obey them need not.”80
Several cargoes of negroes have, it is notorious, been imported from Africa
within the last year, and have been distributed through the interior with
greater or less publicity. The perpetrators of the offence have been well
known; in fact, so far from concealing their share in it, have gloried in it.
We have not yet heard of the conviction and punishment of one of them.
The Federal officials have either winked at the crime, or pursued it with
such laxity that they might better have suffered it to pass altogether unno-
ticed.81
In Slavery’s Capitalism: A New History of American Economic Develop-
ment, Sven Beckert and Seth Rockman explain that human trafficking was so
79. Act of Mar. 2, 1807, ch. 22, 2 Stat. 426.
80 . The Slave-Trade and the Election, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 19, 1860, at 4 , https://www
.nytimes.com/1860/09/19/archives/the-slavetrade-and-the-election.html [https://perma.cc
/5YC2-EKZG].
81 . Id .
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profitable to the growth of American capital that economists and sociologists
have yet to fully calculate “the capital stored in slaves.”82 Nevertheless, what
is understood even if framed in the crudest economic terms is that the value
embedded quite literally in enslaved persons’ bodies “exceeded the combined
value of all the nation’s railroads and factories.”83 This enterprise by its na-
ture was of course global, but within the United States, slavery’s economic
reach extended far beyond Mississippi, Louisiana, and other agrarian states.
Foreign investments “underwrote the expansion of plantation[s],” and the
“highest concentration of steam power in the United States was to be found
along the Mississippi.”84
Thus, if we reimagine female antebellum slaveholders as mindful, en-
gaged capitalists, how might we rethink women’s roles in society, social rela-
tions, law, and virtually every other aspect of American society since the
Civil War? At the very least, taking seriously married white women as capi-
talists who independently and purposefully engaged in slavery challenges the
notion that white women’s economic viability and wealth depended on their
husbands (Jones-Rogers, p. xiii).
As Professor Jones-Rogers points out, the traditional view of women’s
economic security, in part shaped by Adam Smith, contended that a married
woman’s financial security was inextricably tied to her husband’s ingenuity,
brawn, hard work, skill, and thoughtful management of his affairs.85 This
dominant view was very likely true in many instances, but importantly not
all. And conflating white women’s experiences not only, then, participates in
the expungement of their records of complicity in slavery but also contrib-
utes to the enterprise of casting white women as powerless and thoughtless
to the conditions that surrounded them, lacking for more than two centuries
in intellectual and business capacity or the desire to build wealth along the
same lines as men. Such reductive accounts also ignore white women’s
seventeenth-, eighteenth-, and nineteenth-century capitalist interests, greed,
and desire to maintain the status quo. Finally, reading white women slave-
holders as intentional rather than proximate or negligent actors gives rise to
a broader spectrum of questions and concerns (albeit beyond the scope of
this Review) that relate to “young mistresses” and what Jones-Rogers calls
“mistresses in the making” (Jones-Rogers, Chapter One).
Professor Jones-Rogers provides ample evidence why discounting slave-
holding white women’s pecuniary desires tied to slavery simply does not ac-
cord with history. Female slaveholders were as likely as their male
counterparts to blind themselves to the wrongs they perpetuated or to justify
them, disputing abolitionist accounts of slavery and claiming enslaved Blacks
relished their condition, satisfied and even “light-hearted, . . . enjoy[ing] the
82. Beckert & Rockman, supra note 77, at 1.
83. Id .
84. Id .
85. See Jones-Rogers, p. xiii.
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service they render.”86 Slaveholding women, in their own words, help to re-
write this misunderstood or misrepresented history.
Harriet Jacobs offers an alternative, intimate starting point—a Black
woman’s point of view—for dismantling the misconception of white women
as distant, disinterested, passive, and uninvolved holders in human capital.
Her family’s experience in human bondage was defined through white wom-
en’s slave practice in life and death, transferring their human property
through legal documents, including wills at death.87 As historians like Pro-
fessor Jones-Rogers build upon this record through diaries, op-eds, and oth-
er sources, this Review turns to case law to further demonstrate and
demarcate a gendered view of U.S. slavery.
B. Excavating Law: Telling a Woman’s Story
In 1946, Mary Beard, arguably a pioneer in the then-nascent field of
women’s history, argued in her important work Woman as Force in History88
that antebellum accounts of slavery completely misread the status of white
women. For this she held contempt, not only for male scholars who lazily
relied on sophistic tropes rather than rigorous review of the historic record89
but also for feminists who attempted to achieve twentieth-century liberation
by casting eighteenth- and nineteenth-century white women as helpless,
fragile, and completely subordinate to and dependent on men.90 While ac-
knowledging the laws of coverture as relevant to women’s lives, she refuted
what passed as the standard feminist expression of women’s status: that law
effectively denied women independence, vindication of rights, and dignity in
personhood. While the common law defined women’s legal status and expe-
riences in large part, women were not limited to governance under that legal
system.
She argued that courts in equity provided an alternative to the common
law for women. This alternative, as she described it, focused on equity and
justice and not simply precedent as governing within the common law sys-
tem.91 As such, vindicating women’s rights through equity freed women
from the common law—a theory of practice or jurisprudence inherently in-
different to social justice concerns and instead rooted in preserving women’s
unequal and vulnerable status. Given the dominant account that women
were subordinate in nature and law, Beard’s analysis may seem revolution-
86 . See Jones-Rogers, p. 14 (quoting Caroline Gilman, editor of a juvenile newspaper in
the 1830s).
87 . See Jacobs, pp. 7–8.
88. BEARD, supra note 3.
89 . Id . at 56–58.
90 . Id . at 31–32.
91 . Id . at 136.
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ary.92 She writes that “[o]f the original thirteen states, by 1850 several had
recognized or adopted equity jurisprudence and had vested jurisdiction over
cases in equity either in special courts of Chancery or in the ordinary courts
of law.”93 However, a turn to the case law helps to clarify and substantiate
arguments made by Beard and Jones-Rogers.
Taking a cue from Beard, one learns that in cases dating back centuries,
married women could demand the administration of their paraphernal es-
tate. Under such administration, a married woman, who might otherwise be
subject to the rules of coverture, could appeal to courts for the restitution of
her estate. Moreover, she could appeal that her estate be self-administered
rather than governed by her husband. This included all manner of property,
including enslaved persons, notes, bonds, and even debts. If her husband
sold property to which she had a claim, she could receive the value of the
proceeds. Importantly, this was not divorce court, nor did these situations
imply separation.94
Rather, married white women who owned slaves had legal tools at their
disposal to ensure protection of their assets regardless of if and when they
used them. Literally hundreds of cases litigated throughout the nineteenth
century prior to slavery’s abolition address paraphernal rights.95
For example, in Joly v . Weber, the Louisiana Supreme Court held that
where a widow contracted with her future husband prior to marriage that
each party would pay his and her respective debts that existed prior to mar-
riage and the husband reneged on his agreement, the wife could seek restora-
tion of her possessions and the administration of her paraphernal property.96
The court upheld the appellate court judgment in favor of the wife, which
demanded the full restitution of her estate. The Louisiana Supreme Court
found that the husband was reasonably bound and correctly accountable for
the terms of the contract. In affirming the appellate judgment, the court ex-
pressed that the burden of demonstrating the “true state of things” was on
the husband. His failure to account for his management of his wife’s assets
inured to her favor.
More specifically, in cases involving property that included enslaved
peoples, white women also litigated for separation of property and pursued
the restoration of their paraphernal effects—the property they reserved for
92. Id . at 122–25 (explaining that the common law “could not gain undisputed mastery
in America” even though “multitudes of American lawyers” shared Blackstone’s views, and
further documenting the growth of equity jurisprudence in the original thirteen states).
93. Id . at 125.
94. Id . at 137.
95. Paraphernal rights in property law refer to property in which the wife possesses
complete autonomy and control. See supra note 9. Traditionally, this meant that the property
was outside of a dowry. In searching terms related to “paraphernal” and “separation of proper-
ty” in the LexisNexis database, the author found over 300 cases.
96. 35 La. Ann. 806, 810 (1883).
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themselves. In many cases they were successful, so long as they could
demonstrate legal proof of “separation of property” followed by a demand
for the restoration of paraphernal property.97 Consider Gonor v . Gonor,
where creditors sought review of a lower-court judgment that rejected their
intervention in a suit for separation of property based on the husband’s dis-
ordered affairs. In that case, the wife sought a separation of the property,
whereby she could retain her paraphernal rights in her slave and the slave’s
descendants.98
At trial, the wife provided evidence in the form of a notarized receipt of
$200—an act of sale—transacted between herself and her mother in ex-
change for the enslaved mother. Witnesses testified that the enslaved wom-
an, described mostly in the case simply as “property,” did in fact belong to
the wife.99 According to the court, the “slave” and her “descendants” were
acquired with the wife’s funds.100 On review of the case, the Louisiana Su-
preme Court considered whether the enslaved Black woman and her off-
spring were paraphernal. The court concluded that, while all the property
acquired during a marriage is community property, that rule is suspended in
cases where the property received is part of one spouse’s individual rights. In
this instance, the court found that ample evidence existed showing that the
enslaved woman was never part of the husband’s estate or community prop-
erty.101
Gonor v . Gonor is not an unusual holding, and much can be learned
from it and similar cases. Three immediate matters are worth surfacing here.
First, as a rule-of-law matter, courts also perpetuated the social and ultimate-
ly legal norm of erasing Black women’s identities, rendering them objects of
families and law. In this case, Adelaide, the enslaved woman, is often simply
referred to as “slave” or interchangeably “that thing.”102 Indeed, we never
learn the names of Adelaide’s children; they are simply referred to, in math-
ematical terms, as “increase.”103 Second and importantly, such descriptors
translated out of court, too, whereby women such as Adelaide were simply
“things,” objects to be acted upon. Yet, there is more to learn from Gonor v .
Gonor, especially if we consider that “the slave was given to the plaintiff, by
her mother, as an advance upon her inheritance.”104 Thus, third, enslaved
Black women were traded between white women (just as in Harriet Jacobs’s
97 . Gonor v. Gonor, 11 Rob. 526, 526 (La. 1845).
98 . Id .
99 . Id . at 527.
100 . Id . at 529.
101 . Id . at 528.
102 . Id .
103 . Id . at 527.
104 . Id .
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case) like pieces of silver or furniture, making human traffickers of white
women and commodities of Black girls and women.105
What is also clear from Gonor v . Gonor is that of all the value that credi-
tors could claim in a defaulting estate, its enslaved persons were the most
valuable.106 Despite the brevity of the case—barely four pages—much can be
gleaned if our reading of the case is daringly focused on Adelaide rather than
creditors alone or Mrs. Gonor. Notably, the court described Adelaide as “a
mulattress” who joined the Gonors at twelve years old.107 Thus, inherent to
her very existence and DNA were the intersecting occurrences of rape and
commoditization. Her offspring in the years after her enslavement with Mrs.
Gonor were also part of the dispute—though they are nameless. The ques-
tion for the court and the desire of the creditors was whether, even if she was
the property of Mrs. Gonor, her offspring should have been the property of
the community.108
Demonstrating the centrality of slavery to marriages and ownership of
married women, the court referenced precedent, differing authority, and re-
visions in the Civil Code—all related to the question of whether the “increase
of a female slave, constituting the paraphernal property of the wife, belongs
to the community” or the wife alone.109 Far from a case of first impression,
this case—random and yet typical in so many regards—rather explained
many things. By last example, the court spoke to the 1808 revisions of the
Civil Code whereby “a child, the issue of a paraphernal slave, follows the
condition of the mother, and, as such, is paraphernal.”110 The court ex-
plained the principle that “ ‘all that is produced by a thing, whether moveable
or immovable, belongs to the owner of that thing,’ and the young of slaves”
fit this category.111
In some instances, a claim of paraphernal property and separation of
property amounted to fraud, measures used to avoid creditors bearing down
on collective property or the debts of husbands. Specifically, in those in-
stances, white women were willing to commit fraud in order to wrestle the
family’s enslaved Black people from “seizure,” not because they loved or
cared about them but rather because they were valuable. Spencer v . Rist,112
105 . See also Jones v. Morgan’s Heirs, 6 La. Ann. 630, 631 (1851) (addressing an action
for “lands, lots, slaves, houses, &c.,” in which a widow claimed her slaves and other property
were hers outright due to a successful separation of property).
106 . See 11 Rob. at 527.
107 . Gonor, 11 Rob. at 526.
108. Id . at 527.
109. Id .
110. Id .
111. Id. at 528 (quoting A DIGEST OF THE CIVIL LAWS NOW IN FORCE IN THE TERRITORY
OF ORLEANS, WITH ALTERATIONS AND AMENDMENTS ADAPTED TO ITS PRESENT SYSTEM OF
GOVERNMENT (New Orleans, Bradford & Anderson 1808)).
112. 16 La. Ann. 318 (1861).
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Plicque v . Perret,113 Peck v . Vandenberg,114 and many other cases demonstrate
that to defeat the conveyance of enslaved persons to creditors, wives were
willing to use available legal tools, even if exercised in fraud.
In addition, trusts and estate litigation involving disputes over owner-
ship of enslaved Black people were common. Slaveholding women used
courts to vindicate ownership, contest the ownership of others, and push
back against creditors’ claims on enslaved persons within their reach. In
Jones v . Morgan’s Heirs, although we never learn the identities of the “six
slaves,” a widow fought creditors by claiming that the persons who were ei-
ther the property of her husband or their joint estate really belonged to her
outright. She specifically told the court they were “her possession, and under
her control[—] . . . her paraphernal property.”115
Finally, slaveholding white women vindicated their rights related to the
persons they owned even when doing so might cause hardship and humilia-
tion to their spouses. Consider Holmes v . Barbin, a case from 1858 involving
a husband who was insolvent.116 When Joyce Holmes inherited two enslaved
Black people (the court did not humanize them with names), she successfully
sought a judgment against her husband for separation of property, “whereby
she . . . had her title recognized to two slaves free from the control or inter-
ference of her husband.”117 The court dismissed the claim of creditors who
argued the enslaved persons were part of the common property of the estate.
In finding for her heirs, the court noted, “She merely desired to have her
right to a separate administration of her . . . property recognized, and the
community dissolved, on account of the disorder of her husband’s affairs.”118
C. Whitewashing History
Mary Beard and scholars engaged in documenting women’s history offer
a more complex view of white women during the nation’s founding and spe-
cifically the antebellum period. Even where gaps in the record exist, such as
the failure to account for their emotional connection to slavery, these au-
thors nonetheless make clear that slaveholding white women were in the
business and management of human capital—and were successful. The legal
record bears this out.
113. 19 La. 318 (1841).
114. 30 Cal. 11 (1866) (discussing several cases that address the admission of parole evi-
dence to show that a slave is the independent property of a wife).
115. 6 La. Ann. 630, 631 (1851).
116. 13 La. Ann. 474 (1858).
117 . Id . at 474.
118 . Id . at 475.
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In diaries, these women confessed frustrations, anger, and stress, as well
as joy at the birth of new slaves whom they would profit by.119 Even as his-
torical accounts of the last half century suffer for lack of nuance regarding
sexual violence on slaveholding estates, the record of white women as capi-
talist businesswomen engaged in the enterprise of slavery nevertheless be-
comes abundantly clear. Even as Black women are rendered invisible, white
women’s clever and deep involvement with slavery materializes.
Recording this history of white women purchasing, leasing, holding, in-
heriting, disputing, and bequeathing enslaved Black people offers two im-
portant lanes of exploration and insight. First, it disputes prior accounts that
dismissed white women’s involvement in capitalism generally and human
commodification specifically, which problematically placed them outside the
margins of slavery and their own histories. The cases discussed in Part III
contribute to correcting these decades-long misperceptions.
A second lane of insight begs rereading post–Civil War, nineteenth- and
twentieth-century jurisprudence that depicted women as incapable of per-
forming labor, voting, becoming lawyers, serving on juries, or maintaining a
life beyond the care of their children and husband. This rebranded history,
created largely by courts, including the U.S. Supreme Court, served not only
to whitewash white women from slavery’s domestic history but also to stere-
otype women as incapable of conducting “business” of any sort when, in fact,
white women had been key participants in the strongest capitalist business
that the United States had known up to that time.
Why does this matter? Male power, control, and dominion over wom-
en’s lives historically served political purposes and entrenched social and
cultural norms that framed women’s capacities almost exclusively as service
to a husband, mothering, reproducing, and sexual chattel. In a series of laws
and cases after the Civil War, legislatures and the Supreme Court denied
women suffrage based on the sophistry that women lacked good judgment.
They cast women as incapable of thinking and acting independent of male
guidance and authority. What a dramatic change from only years before!
For example, in Minor v . Happersett, the Supreme Court ruled that alt-
hough the Constitution granted women citizenship, it did not confer upon
119 . See, e .g ., Letter from Annie to Lollie (Dec. 14, 1859) (on file with the Lucy Cole Bur-
well Papers, Manuscript Department, William R. Perkins Library, Duke University) (“I see
much of sin—so many things to correct—that I almost despair of being a perfect christian”);
Private Journal of Sarah Lois Wadley, Manuscript Volume No. 3, at 37A (Aug. 20, 1963) (on
file with the Southern Historical Collection, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill)
(“[V]ain desires that every now and then trouble this prevailing one, and my flesh is so weak, I
am always failing.”); Diary of Lucilla McCorkle (July 5, 1846) (on file with the Southern Histor-
ical Collection, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill) (noting that white women who
believed their slaves to be slovenly used “the rod” to impose punishment); Diary of Lucilla
McCorkle, supra note 23.
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them a right to vote. Legislatures and the Court did not foist similar con-
straints on white men.120
Equally, the Supreme Court played a profound role in conscribing wom-
en to second-class citizenship and denying them broad civic participation—
not only denying the right to vote but also constraining women’s ability to
participate in juries and engage in professional employment. For example, in
Bradwell v . Illinois, the Supreme Court upheld a law barring women law
graduates from practicing law.121 Justice Joseph Bradley found that nature
and law deemed it “repugnant” for a woman to adopt “a distinct and inde-
pendent” civic life from her husband because by law she lacked fundamental
capacities.122 How different than decades prior, when in the business of hu-
man chattel, courts recognized women’s business savvy even when separat-
ing their estate and finances from their husbands’.
Nor are these solely matters of the past. Rather, they remain today. In
Ledbetter v . Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co ., the Court limited a woman’s right
to file suit under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act for gender pay claims;123 in
a separate case, it denied female plaintiffs class action status to sue their em-
ployer for sex discrimination.124 Each case was decided by an all-male major-
ity.125 No woman on the Supreme Court voted in favor of these rulings—and
that is no surprise.126 In essence, men have rewritten the history of women in
the United States, creating fictions that serve their interests at the expense of
women.
CONCLUSION
This Review contributes to the remarkably limited legal scholarship on
women’s roles in slavery, both as capitalists and as victims of human traffick-
ing and commodification. It offers an alternative analysis by specifically cast-
ing its lens on white women as slaveholders and Black women as the
survivors of economic, physical, and emotional tyranny. It rereads white
120. Minor v. Happersett, 88 U.S. 162 (1875).
121. Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 130 (1873).
122 . Id . at 141.
123. Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 550 U.S. 618 (2007).
124. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338 (2011).
125 . Minor, 88 U.S. 162 (unanimous majority opinion written by Chief Justice Waite);
Bradwell, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 130 (majority opinion written by Justice Miller, and joined by Jus-
tices Clifford, Davis, Strong, and Hunt; concurring opinion written by Justice Bradley and
joined by Justices Swayne and Field); Ledbetter, 550 U.S. 618 (majority opinion written by Jus-
tice Alito and joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Kennedy, Scalia, and Thomas);
Dukes, 564 U.S. 338 (majority opinion written by Justice Scalia and joined by Chief Justice
Roberts and Justices Alito, Kennedy, and Thomas).
126. Justice Ginsburg did write a concurrence in part for Wal-Mart Stores, Inc . v . Dukes
that Justices Kagan and Sotomayor joined, but the three female justices did not join the Court’s
reasoning in this case and would have dismissed it on other grounds. See 564 U.S. at 367
(Ginsburg, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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women as capable, and even powerful, rather than merely vulnerable or
proximate to power. The Review adds nuance to the terribly reductive ac-
count that all women were property prior to the Civil War. Rather, married
white women were subject to coverture norms, but they also invested in and
owned Black children, women, and men as property.
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